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The purpose of this paper is to examine the political process of bureaucrats’ seemingly 
discretionary allocations among prefectures in Japan’s rice set-aside program. Some 
hypotheses and a model are proposed and then these are empirically tested. Two major 
findings of this study are as follows: 
    Firstly, it is suggested that the bureaucrats’ discretionary allocation tends to be 
revised in response to political pressure. Consequently, allocations among prefectures 
tend to be inversely proportionate to the degree of political pressures. Moreover, such 
pressures can be explained by the expected income from rice-production and the share 
of part-time farmers, who are the majority in Japanese rural society and politically 
powerful. 
    Secondly,  among  various  factors  which  are publicly announced as those used in the 
calculation of allocation, it is suggested that those which may naturally reflect the 
market mechanism remain influential even after revision. Similarly, the factors which 
are contrary to the market mechanism, such as the share of full-time professional 
farmers, become less influential. 
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  1Introduction 
 
It is often pointed out that Japanese bureaucrats have substantial influence in the process 
of political decision-making compared with those in the US. The field of farm policies 
is no exception. The bureaucrats in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
are said not only to wield broad discretionary powers in the implementation of farm 
policies, but also to often take a leading role among political actors, such as politicians 
and interest groups, in the determination of basic farm policy directions. 
    Over-production and huge gluts of agricultural products have troubled policy 
makers in developed countries over the last three decades. If the balance of supply and 
demand, and consequently the prices, of these overly produced commodities were at the 
mercy of the market, the reduction of farmers’ income caused by the decrease of their 
prices would be unacceptable in the political process. Consequently, governments in 
many developed countries have intervened in the market and introduced supply-control 
policies such as market isolation and production quotas. Thus, it is not uncommon that 
these governments also carry out direct interventions such as set-aside programs for 
crops. 
    However, what is unique in the rice set-aside program in Japan is that the amount 
of set-aside acreage for each prefecture is allocated at bureaucrats’ discretion and 
imposed as an inescapable duty
1. Furthermore, these allocations are unevenly assigned 
among prefectures. For example, among prefectures, the ratio of set-aside acreage to the 
amount of total acreage of paddy fields varies from a maximum of over 50% to a 
minimum of less than 10%. This uneven allocation is calculated by bureaucrats instead 
of the market, taking account of several factors following desirable policy directions, 
such as low cost and high quality production. 
    The purpose of this paper is to examine the political process of this bureaucrats’ 
                                                  
1 In addition to this duty of set-aside acreage, new developments and enlargements of 
paddy fields have also been so stringently prohibited. 
  2discretionary allocation in the rice set-aside program, focusing on the different stages of 
allocation among prefectures, from a viewpoint of public choice and to analyze the 
interdependence among political actors behind this allocation. 
    Although there have been a large number of studies concerning farm policies by 
the approach of public choice in the U.S., it is quite rare in Japan. One of exception, 
Fujimoto et al. (1983), examined the relationship between budgets for agriculture and 
the number and the position of politicians elected from rural constituencies. However, 
little study with regard to regulations has been carried out. 
    On the other hand, the rice set-aside program itself has been examined in a huge 
number of studies by Japanese agricultural economists. Yet, most of these studies were 
conducted under the preconception that a compulsory set-aside program is imposed on 
each farmer by a top-down decision-making system and farmers are suffering from this 
imposition. In these studies, the set-aside program has been regarded as if it were a 
policy in a totalitarian regime. In support of this notion, a national target for set-aside 
acreage has almost been accomplished. Most farmers faithfully abide by the regulations 
and detailed prescriptions of the government. 
    H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  p a p e r  r e e v a l u a t e s  the widely preconceived notion of top-down 
decision making by seemingly all-powerful Japanese bureaucrats in set-aside allocations. 
The unevenness of allocation among prefectures is focused on as an important factor in 
this reevaluation. 
 
Overview of the program and behaviors of political actors 
Overview of the program 
 
The allocation system of the rice set-aside program in Japan appears, in short, as a 
top-down decision making system by bureaucrats. The set-aside acreage assigned by the 
national government to each prefecture is similarly allocated to each village by officers 
in prefectural governments. Such allocations are also uneven among villages. Just as 
  3local government officers allocate to villages, so village officers allocate to each hamlet. 
Thus, this process profoundly influences the allocation among hamlets and eventually 
the allocation among farmers. 
        Within an amount of set-aside acreage assigned to a hamlet, each farmer is allowed, 
as a rule, to adjust the assigned acreage by negotiating with neighboring farmers. 
Nevertheless, in reality, the leader of the hamlet assigns the set-aside acreage of each 
farmer proportionate to the size of each farm as a top-down impost. 
    It should be noted that, unlike set-aside programs in other countries, the subsidies 
to the farmers are not sufficient to compensate the income loss
2 caused by the reduction 
of rice production. Although farmers must, on the surface, follow the request of the 
hamlet’s leader, they realize that the acceptance of an allocation results in net income 
loss and they have a justified grievance against this program. One of the most decisive 
factors which oblige farmers to fulfill a top-down impost of set-aside acreage, in spite of 
their unwillingness and their free-riding incentives, is commonly said to be the effect of 
mutual surveillance among farmers which a rural small community inherently possess. 
Since farmers do not want to be regarded as an uncooperative in a relatively closed and 
fixed community, they usually undertake their duty, albeit reluctantly. 
    Although farmers rarely utter grievances directly to government and take no 
radical resistive action such as anti-set-aside rallies or demonstrations, some of them 
occasionally direct bitter complaints about the allocation to the hamlet’s leader at 
community meetings. Naturally, such complaints are transmitted from these leaders to 
local governments’ officers and eventually to bureaucrats. They also may be transmitted 
from village agricultural cooperatives to prefectural federations of cooperatives and 
sometimes to politicians elected from their prefectures through lobbying. 
                                                  
2 Until ten years ago, the rice price had been directly controlled by government. 
Recently, such a stringent control of the price has been abolished. Nevertheless, still 
now the rice price is artificially sustained at the level higher than that at the supposed 
market equilibrium due to indirect price control by the set-aside program. Income loss is 
considerably large partly because of this artificial rice price support and partly because 
of low levels of other crops’ prices and yields. 
  4    Consequently, it is reasonable to suppose that the political process transmits 
farmers’ grievances, and ends up placing political pressure on bureaucrats
3. 
 
How set-aside acreage is allocated among prefectures 
 
As mentioned before, unevenness among prefectures is a remarkable feature of this 
seemingly discretionary allocation. Why have such uneven allocations of set-aside 
acreage among prefectures been intentionally generated and continued? What methods 
have been adopted by bureaucrats to calculate and allocate uneven set-aside acreages 
among prefectures? First of all, these questions are to be clarified prior to the analysis 
    Overall,  the  political  process of determining allocations is not entirely transparent. 
Although most of the factors used in calculating set-aside acreage in each prefecture are 
made public, the formula for calculating these factors is not officially disclosed. 
Concrete data sources are also rarely disclosed. It can only be inferred by a statistic 
analysis as to which factors are prioritized and which are emasculated in the political 
process. 
        Table 1 shows such publicly disclosed factors. It can be observed that these factors 
adopted as variables in the calculation have gradually altered. It is also suggested that 
the formula of calculation has been becoming more intricate whenever the program 
entered a new phase. 
    Before we analyze the political meanings of these factors, two helpful aspects 
                                                  
3 It is crucial in analyzing behaviors of bureaucrats from a viewpoint of public choice 
whether those bureaucrats, i.e. high-ranking officials in government are political 
appointees or not. If they are politically appointed, behaviors of them tend to be 
significantly affected by the policy direction of the ruling party and to become similar to 
those of politicians belonging to that party. That is, the behaviors of bureaucrats can be 
supposed to follow the re-election-maximizing principle. However, Japanese 
bureaucrats are not political appointees. In usual cases, it is reasonable to suppose that 
Japanese bureaucrats can be relatively resistant to political pressures and have an 
unshakable stance for their own policies’ independency even under such pressures, 
compared with those in the U.S. 
  5should be pointed out. To consider these two aspects will enable us to clarify 
backgrounds of each factor. 
    Firstly, it should be noted that these adopted factors were incorporated into the 
calculation formula not merely for the purpose of smooth and acceptable allocations. 
Bureaucrats intentionally introduced these factors in an attempt to implement programs 
represented by slogans aiming at a future vision of Japanese agriculture. For example, in 
the 1980s, the world market of agricultural products, especially grains, became glutted 
with developed countries’ overproduction and export subsidies. As a result, the 
competition between exporting countries and importing countries became severe, so the 
Japanese government attempted to strengthen the competitiveness of Japanese 
agriculture by lowering costs of crops such as rice and wheat. This is why the factor 
representing the productivity of rice growing was intentionally introduced into the 
calculation formula. Furthermore, in this case, the change was officially disclosed, even 
often enthusiastically spread around in order to accelerate a nation-wide 
competitiveness strengthening campaign involving village offices, agricultural 
cooperatives and leaders of farmers. 
    In this sense, unevenness itself may often have a significant and positive meaning 
as a policy message from government to farmers, regional officers and others concerned. 
Uneven allocations play a guiding role to regional agriculture. For instance, if the 
allocation of set-aside acreage in a certain region is heavy, it can be interpreted that 
bureaucrats attempt to lead that region from rice mono-culture to diversified 
agriculture
4. 
    Secondly, it is helpful for understanding political meanings of each factor to 
consider to what extent each factor reflects the market mechanism. Although, 
bureaucrats attempt to artificially and intentionally introduce these factors, it is hard for 
                                                  
4 Of course, unevenness may also often be formed as a passive meaning. For example, if 
soil condition of a region shows inadequateness in drainage and the region is considered 
to be unsuitable for upland crops, the allocation to that region may be reduced. 
  6them to resist the natural tendency of the market mechanism. A factor which reflects the 
tendency of the market mechanism to some extent is expected to be relatively easily 
accepted by farmers and regions because that factor represents farmers’ rational 
economic behaviors to some extent. On the other hand, a factor that has little 
relationship to or is contradictory to the market mechanism is unpalatable to farmers 
and regions. 
    Although this allocation system, as a whole, appears to be an anti-market- 
mechanism, each factor used in the calculation formula does not necessarily have an 
anti-market disposition. On the contrary, most factors can be considered to represent 
parts of an economic tendency revealed in a supply and demand schedule. For example, 
the rate of Jishu-ryutsu-mai (high quality rice) is regarded to represent a factor of the 
demand under recent consumers’ preference towards high quality rice. On the other 
hand, “the crops production targets in each prefecture” is a future vision of crop 
production in each prefecture made by bureaucrats. Since these targets were calculated 
taking into consideration several sub-factors, such as the condition of drainage and 
yields, these are regarded as factors affecting a supply curve. 
        The “Share of full-time professional farmers” factor listed in Table 1 is a key factor 
to examine political meanings of this seemingly bureaucratic discretionary allocation, 
from the viewpoint of bureaucrats’ national program objectives and from that of the 
relationship to the market mechanism. This factor was introduced for the purpose of 
focusing farm policy on full-time professional farmers.
5 The bureaucrats’ intention itself 
sounded valid concern as their promotional campaign was enthusiastic. 
    However, the political feasibility of achieving this policy change seems to be low. 
                                                  
5 In that time, part-time farmers in suburban areas were not only rich as a meaning of 
income flow from off-farm earning but also becoming rich as a meaning of asset 
because the price of land that they possess skyrocketed. Nonetheless, the farm policy 
had indiscriminately supported par-time farmers as well as full-time professional 
farmers. Consequently, this policy stance was scathingly criticized by newspapers and 
popular media-commentators. Therefore, a policy change from indiscriminate protection 
to targeted protection was urgently required. 
  7Interest groups, especially agricultural cooperatives, are reluctant to promote this policy 
direction because the majority of farmers in Japanese rural society are part-time farmers. 
Politicians also hesitate to support this policy direction and in some cases, even oppose 
it, because it would disgruntle the majority of voters in their rural constituencies. 
Consequently, bureaucrats were the sloe advocates for this factor. 
    From the viewpoint of the relationship to the market mechanism, an attempt to 
introduce this factor is incompatible with a natural tendency under a freer market in the 
context of Japanese rural society. Most part-time farmers can obtain a sufficient amount 
of income by their off-farm earnings, so price-cuts of agricultural products do not cause 
them suffer severe problems, while full-time farmers suffer greatly. Thus, the most 
vulnerable class to market competition, especially in rice production, is full-time 
farmers. If bureaucrats attempt to introduce the “share of full-time farmers” factor, they 
would be required to overcome the resistance derived from the natural tendency of the 
market mechanism. 
 
Behaviors of interest groups and bureaucrats 
 
As previously mentioned, it is suspected that farmers’ grievances against compulsory 
set-aside duty are transmitted from village level to government level, and political 
pressure is in turn placed on bureaucrats. The next question to be clarified is how the 
political pressure is formed and how bureaucrats respond to this pressure. 
    It is widely observed not only in Japan but also in other developed countries that 
farmers as an interest group show an outstanding solidarity and exert political power to 
advocate for themselves. In usual cases, such political power would be exerted against 
other groups including the industry sector, consumer groups and tax payers. However, 
in this case, political power is exerted within agricultural sector, among regions. 
    It is commonly preconceived among general people in Japan, even among 
researchers, that the allocation among prefectures in the rice set-aside program is a 
  8typical case in which the political power of bureaucrats’ discretion is decisive. Indeed, 
bureaucrats in the ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries in Japan are relatively 
powerful among other political actors, compared with the ones in the U.S. 
    Nevertheless, in this study, it is our starting point that such bureaucratic 
discretionary decision-making may not be so uncompromising. It may also be doubtful 
that bureaucrats’ discretion could overwhelmingly suppress political pressures. It is 
dubious whether allocation among prefectures would be determined one-sidedly in a 
top-down way. It is reasonable to suppose that political pressures generated from 
farmers’ grievances against insufficient compensation have had an influence on 
bureaucrats’ allocations to a considerable extent, under a normal democracy. 
    In addition to grievances against the program itself, feelings of injustice about the 
allocation among prefectures aggravate the political situation. Since an initial draft of 
allocations based on bureaucrats’ discretion is calculated, taking into consideration 
priorities in their policy direction, unevenness of allocations among regions do not 
necessarily accord with unevenness of the degree of acceptance among regions
6. 
Farmers’ grievances derived from their subjective utility loss vary from farmer to 
farmer
7. Such uneven farmers’ grievances aggregate to uneven regional political 
pressure. Unevenness of farmers’ subjective grievances and consequently regional 
political pressure are often magnified by uneven allocation. This magnified unevenness 
ferments feelings of injustice towards other prefectures’ allocation
8. 
    There are two routes by which farmers’ grievances are transmitted in a bottom-up 
                                                  
6 For example, a prefecture to which lighter burden of set-aside acreage is allocated may 
show stronger political pressure, requiring much lighter burden, if farmers’ subjective 
utility loss in the prefecture is extremely high. 
7 An income loss of a farmer can be objectively estimated by calculation if he has a 
scrupulously taken book-keeping. However, a subjective utility loss does not necessarily 
equal to it. For instance, part-time farmers feel heavy burden to convert to other crops 
growing from conventional rice growing, as explained later in detail. 
8 The existence of these unfair feelings is becoming officially acknowledged, according 
to the report of the advisory council, Seisan-chousei-kenkyukai (the Council of the rice 
set-aside program) (2002). 
  9manner: one through official route from a village office to a local government, and the 
other is via cooperatives. For officers in a local government, a low set-aside allocation 
in their region is preferable because it would be easier to implement. For directors in a 
prefectural federation of agricultural cooperatives, smaller allocations are also desirable 
because they would face less remonstrance from farmers. Regional and prefectural 
officers thus attempt to put political pressures on bureaucrats in unison. These political 
actors
9 may behave as if they constitute a united interest group representing a prefecture. 
As a result, bureaucrats face uneven political pressures among prefectures. 
 
Hypotheses, models and methodology of analysis 
Hypotheses 
 
    As mentioned previously, it seems that the allocation among prefectures is 
determined simply by the bureaucrats’ discretion instead of the market. However, this 
paper hypothesizes that such decision-making at bureaucrats’ discretion would not 
completely disregard the remonstrance of farmers. It is also assumed that the draft of the 
allocation would be revised, considering the degree of grievances. 
    Under this basic hypothesis, the following two concrete hypotheses are presented 
and empirically tested. 
 
    Hypothesis 1: Bureaucrats revise the initial draft of their discretionary allocations 
among prefectures in the direction approximately inversely proportionate to the degree 
of political pressure caused by farmers’ grievances. Bureaucrats attempt to equalize the 
risk of the failure to achieve the assigned acreage in each prefecture. Moreover, the 
degree of political pressure is explained by two variables: the level of expected income 
                                                  
9 Politicians elected from the region may sometimes play a role to assist such political 
movements from a sense of the so-called pork barrel action. But they do not lead such a 
movement. Their role is merely supplementary. 
  10from rice production and the share of part-time farmers. In Japanese rural society, 
part-time farmers are the majority, while full-time professional farmers are the minority. 
    Hypothesis 2: Among the factors which are publicly announced to be used in 
calculating the allocation, those which reflect potential incentives derived from the 
market, such as low cost of production, tend to retain their considerable explanatory 
power even after the allocation is revised by incorporating farmers’ grievances through 
a political process. Meanwhile, those which are not advocated by political actors other 
than bureaucrats and do not reflect potential incentives from the market are relatively 
emasculated after such a revision. 
 
    Hypothesis 1, especially the last part that the degree of political pressure is 
explained by two variables, the level of expected income from rice production and the 
share of part-time farmers, is explained in detail as follows: 
    The cost of rice production varies among regions. The price of rice also varies 
among regions, reflecting difference of quality. Reflecting these differences, farmers’ 
income losses also vary from region to region
10. Most Japanese farmers operate as a 
family farm. The principle of behaviors is not profit-maximizing but 
income-maximizing. Thus, expected income is the most suitable index for representing 
damage cause by set-aside programs
11. Although subjective utility loss for a farmer 
cannot necessarily be equivalent to this objective income loss, it can approximately 
represent the relative relationship among regions if we compare them within the same 
farmers’ categories, such as the part-time farmer class. 
    The  point  here  is  another variable, that is, the share of part-time farmers. Part-time 
farmers feel relatively heavy burden if they convert to new crops from conventional rice 
growing because of the increase of labor input and new investments of machines. Even 
                                                  
10 Speaking accurately, income loss of rice production plus other converted crops’ 
income plus subsidies is net income loss. 
11 Correctly speaking, this is only true under the assumption that subsidies and income 
from converted crops are the same. This assumption roughly holds on true. 
  11in the case of fallowing, weeding is a laborious job on a hot and humid sunny day. 
Under rice cultivation, irrigated water covering paddies can prevent weeds. Furthermore, 
part-time farmers are accustomed to growing rice. It is easy for them to continue 
growing rice with routinely practiced, less laborious and low risk methods. Although 
they have sufficient income from off-farm earnings, income from growing rice is fairly 
attractive extra-revenue, mainly because it is not laborious. By contrast, for full-time 
professional farmers, the burden of conversion from rice to other crops is relatively 
lighter, although they also feel reluctance to set up new crops. The reason is that they 
can start such a relatively large amount of acreage with adequate labor power that 
returns on new investments are meaningful. Consequently, the grievances of part-time 
farmers relating to set-aside programs tend to be larger than those of full-time farmers. 
    Furthermore, the grievances of part-time farmers tend to be more overtly voiced 
from a political viewpoint. In Japanese rural society, part-time farmers are the majority, 
while full-time professional farmers are the minority. Since the decision making in 
agricultural cooperatives follows the one-member one-vote principle, the majority of 
rural society, that is, part-time farmers, can control the political orientation of 
agricultural cooperatives. Politicians also advocate the opinions of part-time farmers 
rather than those of full-time farmers because they are the majority of voters. Thus, 
part-time farmers are expected to be more politically influential than full-time farmers. 
It is reasonable to suppose that in a region where the share of part-time farmers is larger, 





In order to verify the validity of the hypotheses, a model and a multiple-regression were 
constructed as follows: 
    Hypothesis  1  was  tested  using  a  model  consisting of the two explanatory variables 
  12representing farmer’s grievances and political pressure. 
 
PPi = (EIi, PFi） 
DSAi = f (PPi) = F (EIi, PFi) 
 
PPi : Political pressure of i prefecture to bureaucrats 
DSAi: The degree of the burden of set-aside assignment imposed on i prefecture by the 
     government 
EIi: The average expected income per day from rice production in i prefecture 
PFi: The share of households with part-time farmers in all households conducting 
    agricultural  activities  in  i  prefecture 
 
Expected signs are as follows: 
∂DSA i / ∂EIi < 0 
∂DSA i / ∂PFi < 0 
 
Here, suppose that stronger political pressure in a certain prefecture makes bureaucrats 
revise and reduce its allocation to a larger extent. Consequently, it is expected that the 
degree of burden of set-aside assignment among prefectures is inversely proportionate 
to the level of average expected income and the share of households with part-time 
farmers. 
 
        Hypothesis 2 was tested by a multiple-regression consisting of the three 
explanatory variables. These variables were selected from the list of factors which are 
made public to be used in the formula of calculating allocations, as shown in Table 1. 
Since variables included in this multiple-regression are selected from the list above, 
they cannot cover all factors used in allocation calculations. Moreover, the purpose of 
analyzing this regression is not to verify the validity of explanatory variables, but to find 
  13out the reduction of explanatory power of each variable, in order to detect the 
emasculation of factors. Therefore, this regression should not be called a ‘model’. 
 
DSA I = G（COSTi, QUALITYi, FTFi） 
 
COSTi: The average cost per bag (60kg) of rice in i prefecture
12
QUALITYi: The share of Jishu-ryutsu-mai (high quality rice) in total amount of 
    distributed  rice  in  i  prefecture 
FTFi: The share of households with full-time professional farmers in all households   
    conducting  agricultural activities in i prefecture 
 
Expected signs are as follows: 
∂DSA i / ∂COSTi > 0 
∂DSA i / ∂QUALITYi < 0 
∂DSA I / ∂FTFi < 0 
 
    This conceptual model and regression need to be converted to empirical ones. To 
this end, functional form was considered. Theoretically, the effects of two variables in 
the model should be multiplied by the degree of political pressure. In this sense, 
double-log form seemed to be appropriate. With regard to the regression related to 
bureaucrats’ seemingly discretionary allocation formula, there was no theoretical ground 
to adopt such a double-log form. However, the same functional form was adopted for 
the latter regression, considering that the consistency of functional forms enables us to 
compare appropriately. 
 
                                                  
12 In Table 1, there is merely the name of factor, “Productivity” mentioned. No concrete 
data can be specified from this abstract notion. But, in this paper, we interpret this 
notion as a meaning of cost and the data related to cost was adopted as one of the 
selected explanatory variables. 
  14Log(DSAi) = α0 + α1Log(EIi) + α2Log(PFi) 
Log(DSAi) = β0 + β1Log(COSTi) + β2Log(QUALITYi) + β3Log(FTFi) 
 
    In order to confirm the validity of the selection of functional form by theoretical 
considerations, the RESET tests and the White hetero-skedasticity tests were carried out. 
With regard to the political pressure model, the results of the RESET tests showed that 
the possibility of existing errors was highly rejected. Other functional forms such as 
linear and semi-log type were also tested. There was no other form which shows 
remarkably better performance than double-log form. The functional form adopted by 
theoretical considerations was empirically confirmed to be valid. The results of the 
White tests showed that, in every year except for 1980, the possibility of existing 
hetero-skedasticity was rejected. This fact also indirectly suggests the validity of the 
selection of functional form. As for 1980, the result relating to t-statistics using the 
White hetero-skedasticity consistent covariance was also juxtaposed with the results 
from normal estimation
13. 
    With regard to the regression related to bureaucrats’ seemingly discretionary 
allocation formula
14, the results of the White tests showed that the possibility of existing 
hetero-skedasticity was significantly suspected in 1984 and 1988. Consequently, as 
similarly as the case of the political pressure model, the results of these two years 
relating to t-statistics using White hetero-skedasticity consistent covariance were shown 
to be parallel. 
 
Estimation method and data 
                                                  
13 According to Davidson and McKinnon (1993), results of this estimation method 
become unstable when the number of sample is not so large. In that case, adoption of 
this method instead of conventional estimation does not necessarily warrants us to 
improvement of the estimation. Hence, here, both results were shown, 
14 To discuss absolute values of the results of the RESET tests relating to this regression 
is inherently meaningless because not all conceivable factors are incorporated into the 
regression. 
  15 
The estimation method adopted on two regressions is principally OLS. But as 
mentioned before, in some cases where hetero-skedasticity was observed, White hetero- 
skedasticity consistent covariance was employed. Estimation tests were conducted by a 
cross-prefecture multiple regression over twenty-two years. Data were collected from 
official statistics and government-published data on the rice set-aside program 
(“Suiden-riyou Saihen-taisaku Jisseki-chousa Kekkahyou” [Surveys of the situation of 
the implementation of the rice set-aside program] (1980-2001)). 
    With regard to explanatory variables, PF and FTF, the data from statistics of the 
Agricultural Census (1975-2000) were employed. The data related to EI and COST 
were calculated from statistics of the “Surveys of Rice Production Cost” (1975-2001). 
The data of QUALITY were obtained from the “Beika ni Kansuru Shiryo” [documents 
relating to rice price] (1979-2001) released from the Food Agency. As for PF, extremely 
small farms, which were operated for the purpose of hobby farming, were excluded. As 
for FTF, full-time but elderly farmers, i.e. over sixty, were excluded. As for COST, since 
the data in years when severe cold weather damaged the yield of rice were abnormal, 
the data in such years were replaced by those in normal years. 
    In determining a dependent variable, there were several data constraints. The rice 
set-aside program started in 1971, however, the data in the first decade are not available. 
Therefore the observation period is from 1980 to 2001. The degree of set-aside 
allocation was represented by the figures of set-aside acreage divided by total acreage of 
paddy fields. This figure was extremely high in Tokyo, Osaka and Kanagawa 
prefectures because land conversion to non-farm use from farm use has rapidly 
progressed due to urbanization in these areas. Therefore, these prefectures were 




  16The table 2 shows the results of the political pressure model. Signs of all explanatory 
variables in each year are consistent with theoretically expected ones. Moreover, the 
values of adjusted R square are more than 0.6 from 1988 to 1993. These levels are 
judged to be a considerably good performance, considering average scores of 
cross-section analyses. All figures of t-statistics of the two explanatory variables are 
also highly significant. Overall, hypothesis 1 was empirically supported. 
   Consequently, these suggest that bureaucrats consider the balance of farmers’ 
grievances against the set-aside program among regions and tend to revise the allocation 
of set-aside acreage in inverse proportion to the degree of farmers’ grievances. Thus, 
political pressure can be succinctly explained by two variables: expected income, which 
represents a loss of rent, and thereby the degree of grievance; and the share of part-time 
farmers, which represents a majority of farmers who tend to express their complaints. 
    If we take a look at time-series figures in detail, a further discovery can be found. 
From 1978 to 1986, the scores of adjusted R square had not been high, while, in the 
middle part of the observation period, they had been adequately high. Then after 1994, 
they have gradually been decreasing. This fact can be well explained by the policy 
change which happened during this period. This will be explained in detail in the next 
section. 
        Table 3 shows the results of the multiple regressions consisting of several selected 
factors which are made public to be used in bureaucrats’ seemingly discretionary 
allocation formula. According to these results, some explanatory variables in some years 
were insignificant or showed the wrong sign. In particular, FTF showed the worst 
statistical performance. Signs consistently contradicted expected ones and these wrong 
signs and the figures of coefficients were highly significant. Since this explanatory 
variable is one of the factors rarely advocated by political actors, except for bureaucrats, 
and its features are contrary to the market mechanism, hypothesis 2 was empirically 
supported. 
        On the other hand, COST showed good statistical performance. Signs are the same 
  17as the expected ones and the scores of all coefficients were significant at 10% level; the 
scores of 80% of them were significant at 1% level. The slogan, “low cost production”, 
which had been promoted during the 1980s and until now, was surely realized in 
bureaucrats’ seemingly discretionary allocations. The crucial reason is suspected to be 
inherently in accordance with the market mechanism. 
    QUALITY showed a relatively fuzzy disposition between that of the variable, 
COST, and that of the variable, FTF. 
    In short, Table 3 suggests that, among various factors which are publicly 
announced as those used in the calculation of allocations, those which naturally reflect 
the normal market situation are influential even after being revised in the political 
process, while those, the features of which are contrary to the market mechanism, are 
suspected to become less influential after political revision. In particular, it is suggested 
that the latter factors, such as the share of full-time professional farmers, may be 
emasculated in the political process, irrespective of bureaucrats’ initial intention. 
 
Discussion 
Change of the model’s explanatory power 
 
The change of the model’s explanatory power, which was typically observed in 
time-series change of scores of the adjusted R square, can be well explained by the 
policy change during this period. 
    At the beginning of this program, the ratio of set-aside acreage to production area 
was not so large. Therefore, farmers’ grievances themselves might not have been so 
serious. Furthermore, bureaucrats had taken a relatively high-handed stance towards 
prefectures in order to fulfill the targeted reduction. As a result, it is likely that the 
explanatory power of the model is not so high under a combination of lower political 
pressure and bureaucrats’ stronger inclination for discretionary decision-making. 
        However, in the middle of the observation period, government had to force farmers 
  18to accept higher levels of set-aside acreage because of an accumulated glut of rice. In 
order to achieve this high targeted set-aside acreage, government changed the stance 
towards lending their ears to farmers’ complaints at regional level. This might have 
played a role in collecting information about the acceptability of each region. It is 
convincing that the explanatory power of the model shows highest performance during 
this middle part of the period. In other words, this middle part of the period is a typical 
age when the political situation which is depicted by the model can actually be 
observed. 
    The explanatory power of the model decreased again during the last part of the 
observation period. The reason may be inferred that government changed the basic 
direction of allocation from an artificial and intentional policy-oriented principle to a 
market-oriented principle. 
 
Bureaucrats’ behaviors as rational individuals 
 
One of the points of this study is that, even though bureaucrats in Japanese ministries 
are not political appointees, it is suggested that the allocation of the rice set-aside 
program by bureaucrats’ discretion can be revised by political pressure. Therefore, the 
incentives that force bureaucrats to accept such political pressure should be clarified. 
    Among the principles of bureaucrats’ behaviors which have been explained in 
previous studies in the field of public choice, the budget-maximizing principle 
presented by Niskanen (1971) is one of the most plausible and widely accepted. 
However, this theory cannot apply to this case of set-aside programs because it is not a 
matter of budget but one of regulation
15. On the other hand, as Downs (1967) and Chant 
                                                  
15 Regulation theories, such as the conceptual model by Peltzman (1976), seem to be 
applicable. Nevertheless, it is difficult because the model assumes that government as a 
policy maker and bureaucrats as those in charge of its implementation are aimed at 
maximizing the probability of being re-elected. This means that bureaucrats are political 
appointees. This is not suitable for the case of Japanese bureaucrats who are not 
  19and Acheson (1972) pointed out, prestige is one of the important incentives for 
bureaucrats’ behaviors. According to Breton and Wintrobe (1982), many other studies 
concerned with incentives of bureaucrats’ behaviors mentioned that career promotion is 
also an important incentive. 
    Prestige and promotion may explain why bureaucrats in charge of rice set-aside 
programs accept political pressures relatively easily even though they are not political 
appointees. To insist on promoting a future Japanese agricultural vision may contribute 
to their career and prestige, of course. However, it would bring more serious damage to 
their prestige and an individual’s career if such insistence incurred strong resistance to 
uneven discretionary allocation from some prefectures and eventually resulted in a fatal 
deadlock or the like. 
    On  one  side,  to  continue  to  chant  slogans which support publicly disclosed factors 
used in the allocation calculating formula, and on the other side, to reconcile with 
political pressure, is a wise strategy for bureaucrats to maintain their prestige and the 
possibility of individuals’ career promotions. Since how to weight these factors in the 
calculation formula is not transparent, bureaucrats can take advantage of this lack of 
transparency to achieve both program and political objectives: chanting slogans in order 
to promote future visions, and reconciling with political pressure by lessening the 
weights of strongly opposed factors in the calculation. 
    Additionally, it should be noted that, in a sense, such behaviors should not be 
one-sidedly criticized as a political distortion. As mentioned above, indeed, such 
revision may often cause undesirable and inefficient resource allocation. However, 
bureaucrats inherently have a limited volume of information related to farmers’ 
subjective utility loss. To take note of farmers’ grievances is, from a political viewpoint, 
an improvement in bureaucrats’ attitude, compared with that in some decades ago. As 
textbooks of public economics often mention, government, if it attempts to replace the 
market, intrinsically has insufficient information. This feature causes so called 
                                                                                                                                                  
political appointees. 
  20government failure. In a sense, the fact that farmers’ grievances are transmitted to 
bureaucrats in a bottom-up manner is appreciated as a complement to the supply 
information to bureaucrats and government in order to prevent government failure. It 
may also be said in the political science context that bureaucrats should positively and 
willingly take note of farmers’ grievances, aside from problems in the economic context, 
as explained in the next sub-section. 
 
Market, bureaucrats and political intervention 
 
In regions where full-time farmers are densely concentrated, the burden of set-aside 
acreage is heavy, while it is lighter in regions where part-time farmers are concentrated. 
This may surprisingly suggest that policies favoring full-time professional farmers and 
reducing support for part-time farmers are completely emasculated. The next question is 
why such a paradoxical phenomenon happens. 
    Discretionary allocations carried out by bureaucrats instead of the market place 
importance on optimal resource allocation. However, discretionary allocations may pay 
little attention to fair income distribution. The degree of farmers’ grievances can be 
regarded as representing the possible loss of farmers’ utility. Therefore, the imbalance of 
political pressure among prefectures can be interpreted as a result of unfair 
redistribution caused by the allocation by bureaucrats. As Peltzman (1976) pointed out, 
because of the dominance of political pressure for redistribution on the regulatory 
process, it is difficult and unrealistic for the allocation of set-aside acreage among 
prefectures to be determined only by the discretionary judgments of bureaucrats who 
mainly consider optimal resource allocation, not fair income distribution. 
    The discretionary  allocation carried out by bureaucrats inherently has a possibility 
of “government failure” because the information which bureaucrats can obtain and 
utilize is insufficient for achieving optimal resource allocation compared to the market. 
In this sense, it is difficult for bureaucrats to optimally implement the discretionary 
  21allocation, substituting for the market mechanism. Furthermore, with regard to fairness 
of income distribution, inadequate information may be provided to bureaucrats because 
farmers’ subjective utility loss cannot be revealed in statistic data or any other officially 
published information. On the other hand, the principle of farmer behavior depends 
upon income distribution. Political pressure also derives mainly from unfairness of 
income distribution. When bureaucrats face political pressures from some regions, they 
may not be able to persuade protesters and may find it difficult to resist such claims. 
    If we judge this outcome from a viewpoint of political science, it may be 
significant to some extent because top-down decision making was tempered by a 
bottom-up process, incorporating farmers’ opinions into allocations among regions. In 
addition to this, such opinions accurately represent the majority of rural society. 
However, if looked at from an economic viewpoint, it can be said to be irrational. This 
is because efficient low cost farming by full-time farmers are relatively strongly 
restricted, while rich but inefficient part-time farmers are suffering less income loss and 
are more supported by government policy. 
    The policy implication from this study is clear. In the past, Japanese bureaucrats 
have been powerful and played a major role among political actors. This rice set-aside 
program and discretionary allocation among prefectures might have been established 
under this tradition. However, in a society where democracy has matured, such 
top-down decision making might have become unacceptable, faced with grievances of 
voters and political pressures. These political pressures may include helpful information 
which contributes to improvement in the fairness of income distribution. However, on 
the other hand, they may cause irrational resource allocation. 
    The lesson from the experience in the rice set-aside program suggests that 
bureaucrats’ discretionary allocation could not efficiently replace the market mechanism. 
The complementary political process may also be inadequate and make the allocation 
more perverse. An alternative method is to incorporate the market mechanism, step by 
step. 
  22 
Concluding remarks 
 
The two major findings of this study are as follows: 
    Firstly, it was suggested that the bureaucrats’ discretionary allocation tends to be 
revised in response to political pressure. Consequently, allocations among prefectures 
tend to be inversely proportionate to the degree of political pressures. Moreover, such 
pressures can be explained by the expected income from rice-production and the share 
of part-time farmers, who are the majority in Japanese rural society and politically 
powerful. 
    Secondly,  among  various  factors  which  are publicly announced as those used in the 
calculation of allocation, it was suggested that those which may naturally reflect the 
market mechanism remain influential even after revision. Similarly, the factors which 
are contrary to the market mechanism, such as the share of full-time professional 




Breton, A., and R. Wintrobe. “The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic 
    Analysis  of  Competition,  Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public 
    Organizations.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, (1982). 
Chant, J. F., and K. Acheson. “The choice of monetary instruments and the theory of 
    bureaucracy.”  Public Choice, 12(1972): 13-34. 
Davidson, R. and J. MacKinnon. “Estimation and Inference in Economics.” 
    Oxford  University  Press,  Oxford,  UK,  (1993). 
Downs, A. “Inside Bureaucracy.” Little, Brown and Company, Boston, US, (1967). 
Fujimoto, Y., Y. Ohiwa, H. Kawanobe, K. Kurokawa, and A. Yokoyama. “Yosan-haibun 
    to Seijiteki-youso [Allocation of budgets and its political factors].” Public Choice 
  23    Studies (Japanese) 3 (1983): 56-67. 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Food Agency. “Beika ni Kansuru 
    S h i r y o ” [Documents relating to rice price] (1979-2001). 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Production Bureau. “Suiden-riyou 
    Saihen-taisaku  Jisseki-chousa  Kekkahyou” [Surveys of the situation of the 
        implementation of the rice set-aside program] (1980-2001). 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Statistics Bureau. “The Agricultural 
    Census.”  (1975-2000). 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Statistics Bureau. “The Surveys of 
    Rice  Production  Cost.”  (1975-2001). 
Niskanen, W.A. “Bureaucracy and Representative Government.” Aldine Publishing 
    Company,  Chicago,  US  (1971). 
Peltzman, S. “Toward a more general theory of regulation.” Journal of Law and 
    Economics, 19 (1976): 210-240. 
Seisan-chousei-kenkyukai [the Council of the rice set-aside program]. “Seisan-chousei- 
    Kenkyukai-Saishuhoukoku [The final report of the Council of the rice set-aside 
    program].”  (2002). 
  24Table 1 List of Factors Used in the Calculation of Allocations 
Phase  Major factors to be incorporated into the calculation 
Phase 1 
 (1971-1975) 
1. Proportionate to the past production 
2. Proportionate to the past amount to be purchased by government 
3. The crop production targets in each prefecture* 
Phase 2 
 (1978-1986) 
1. The crop production targets 2. Share of Jishu-Ryutsu-mai (high quality rice) 
3. Specification index to promoted crops 4. Ratio of well-drained paddy 
5. Frequency of suffering from natural disasters such as cold whether and flood 
6. Share of the paddies in urbanized areas 7. Share of enlarged and improved 
paddy plots equipped with drainage facilities 
Phase 3 
(1987-1992) 
Six factors on the list above from 2 to7 plus 




Reduced acreage of set-aside was calculated by factors as follows: 
1. Productivity 2. Share of full-time farmers 3. Dependency of agriculture on 
rice production 4. Willingness of the return to rice production 
Phase 5 
(1996-1997) 
Increased acreage was calculated by factors as follows: 
1. Proportionate to the past acreage of paddy 2. Share of full-time farmers 
3. Share of Jishu-Ryutsu-mai (high quality rice) 
Phase 6 
(1998-1999) 
Increased acreage was calculated by factors as follows: 
1. Proportionate to the past acreage of paddy 
Phase 7 
(2000-) 
Increased acreage was calculated by factors as follows: 
1. Amount of the stock of Jishu-Ryutsu-mai (high quality rice) 2. Dependency 
of rice production on the rice purchased by government (low quality rice) 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, “Seisan-chosei no genjou to kadai” [The present situation and 
problems of the rice set-aside program], 2002. 
Note*: The crop production targets in each prefecture are an estimation of future crop production in 
each prefecture made by bureaucrats, calculated taking account of several sub-factors, such as the 







  1Table 2 Result of Estimation (The Political Pressure Model) 
Fiscal 
Year 
Expected income per day 
from rice production (EI) 
Share of households with 
part-time farmers (PF) 
Adjusted R square 
R¯
2
1980 -0.363852***(-3.00255) -1.002532***(-5.77202) 0.503765 
1981 -0.251741**(-2.57040)  -0.859714***(-5.16702) 0.443716 
1982 -0.184163*(-1.86839)  -0.867369***(-4.89194) 0.402766 
1983 -0.236255**(-2.41409)  -0.825965***(-4.47391) 0.433857 
1984 -0.294446***(-2.90368) -0.898810***(-4.68543) 0.473509 
1985 -0.364873***(-3.411453)  -0.910321***(-4.64972) 0.503296 
1986 -0.319392***(-3.30278) -0.957067***(-5.06892) 0.517103 
1987 -0.248964***(-3.56378) -0.778303***(-5.76498) 0.577108 
1988 -0.213605***(-3.65822) -0.789413***(-6.03306) 0.601293 
1989 -0.227878***(-3.90512) -0.762154***(-5.99149) 0.633393 
1990 -0.211456***(-3.67650) -0.704900***(-5.40015) 0.610086 
1991 -0.201192***(-4.01013) -0.683793***(-5.19517) 0.634754 
1992 -0.250787***(-3.95489) -0.641582***(-4.17073) 0.605816 
1993 -0.317816***(-4.22996) -0.739775***(-4.47477) 0.652930 
1994 -0.322426**(-2.53246)  -1.115280***(-4.22778) 0.502611 
1995 -0.347100***(-2.91654) -0.993991***(-5.29453) 0.542807 
1996 -0.303561***(-3.15725) -0.881055***(-6.13591) 0.588032 
1997 -0.299818***(-3.08345) -0.859529***(-5.69315) 0.581906 
1998 -0.175921***(-2.84252) -0.651020***(-5.63132) 0.565174 
1999 -0.183496***(-3.16990) -0.604000***(-5.15015) 0.565639 
2000 -0.182533***(-3.47584) -0.583132***(-5.03141) 0.573908 
2001 -0.143168***(-3.06659) -0.516459***(-5.10857) 0.540680 
Note: 1) Figures in the first and second columns are the scores of parameter coefficients. Those in 
parentheses are scores of t-statistics. 








  2Table 3 Result of Estimation (Regressions Relating to Bureaucrats’ Discretion) 
Fiscal 
year 
Share of households 
with full- time farmers 
(FTF) 
Average cost per bag 
of rice 
(COST) 
Share of Jishu- ryutsu- 





1980  0.10353(1.42346) 0.49015**(2.54991)  -0.14620**(-2.36458)  0.319883 
1981  0.06347(0.92714) 0.49110*  (1.82013)  -0.13948**(-2.50822)  0.233590 
1982  0.06685(1.03292) 0.52976**(2.65238)  -0.11905**(-2.10339)  0.296930 
1983  0.09894(1.48625) 0.66166***(3.08470) -0.14607**(-2.51483)  0.357808 
1984  0.15233**(2.46090) 
       **(2.10653) 
1.06927***(4.81020)
       **(5.05181)
-0.15546***(-3.02321) 
        **(-2.68382) 
0.492769 
1985  0.10389(1.49822) 0.66808***(3.51768) -0.19554***(-3.50770)  0.410533 
1986  0.14011**(2.13317) 1.11849***(4.63530) -0.14939***(-2.86602)  0.498465 
1987  0.12383**(2.52331) 0.79062***(5.09708) -0.09852**(-2.49713)  0.510986 
1988  0.08896*(1.69799) 
        ( 1 . 4 9 6 8 2 )  
0.70547***(3.41447)
      ***(3.85892)
-0.12913**(-2.50536) 
        *(-1.86693) 
0.378622 
1989  0.17634***(3.88629) 1.02499***(5.61896) -0.29165**(-2.15429) 0.487166 
1990  0.14211***(3.41031) 0.70068***(4.97968) -0.14433**(-2.68288)  0.577618 
1991  0.07639 (1.62473)  0.33884**(2.45223)  -0.26155***(-3.48585)  0.365581 
1992  0.08941*(1.95487) 0.81918***(4.86336) -0.29334***(-3.67120)  0.498842 
1993  0.16841***(3.19447) 0.93959***(4.36878) -0.98989  (-1.11960)  0.379464 
1994  0.32378***(4.70731) 1.55627***(5.34282) -0.32353**(-2.53926) 0.566989 
1995  0.19951***(3.40856) 1.12118***(3.99142) -0.34262**(-2.17628) 0.424676 
1996  0.14880***(3.40450) 0.99551***(5.15642) -0.27649**(-2.17636) 0.507915 
1997  0.17312***(3.52664) 0.89649***(4.53426) -0.13040 (-1.14917)  0.431648 
1998  0.13678***(3.31782) 0.77235***(4.41765) -0.09809 (-0.28284)  0.452057 
1999  0.12527***(3.12786) 0.69758***(4.61436) 0.04182 (0.16902)  0.417774 
2000  0.16717***(4.18409) 0.92626***(6.15059) 0.30184 (0.99480)  0.520145 
2001  0.12702***(3.78763) 0.67454***(5.20378) 0.04703 (0.23939)  0.468927 
Note: 1) Figures in the first and second columns are the scores of parameters’ coefficients. Those in 
parentheses are scores of t-statistics. 
2) *P<0.1, **P<0.05 and ***P<0.01 
3) Figures on lower lines in 1984 and 1988 are t-statistics calculated from White hetero-skedasticity 
consistent covariance. 
4) Shaded figures showed different signs from the theoretically expected ones. 
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